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MOTION
No. 71-5103 OT 1971
Morrissey v. Brewer, Warden
APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Certiorari was granted in this case on December 20, 1971.

The

case will be argued later this Spring.

Petr has filed this appliDon
cation for appointment of counsel noting that W./Britton, Jr. of
Des Moines, Iowa represen ted

Petr before the CA 8 (he was appointed

to represent Petr by that court).

He argued and briefed the case

before the Eight Circuit and handled the successful petition for
cert in this Court.

He has filed his application for admission

to the Supreme Court.
Unless the CJ has other counsel in mind, I would grant this
application to appoint Mr. Britton.
GRANT APPLICATION
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Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19. ,.
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Morrissey v. Brewer
Cert to CA 8
to
This is an application/be allowed to file
in the above entitled case.

(...tv.i.;...,

aEcus?

The Morrissey was granted earlier
II

this Term and will be argued either late this Term or next
Term.

It raises the question o f ~ to a<fa"role revocat~

hearing.

This amicus, James Russell, is a defendant in a

case in the CA 7; he has raised the same claim in that Circuit and the CJ of that Circuit has ordered that no further
action be taken in his case until the Supreme Court det!-f5)<:les
this case.

Russell has received the approval of all the

parties, except one of the Petitioners.

.s

His congent has not

been secured only because an attorney has not yet been appointed
to represent him in his ffeliiiid hearing on the merits in this
Court.
job of

Russell's attorneys appear to have done a competent

#iii writing this brief.

I would grant the motion to

file.
It should also be noted that, unlike most amicus briefs,
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this one is not printed.
dispense with printing.

Russell has filed a motion to
Ordinarily I wonder about the

propriety of putting this Court to the expense of reproducing
9 copies of an amicus brief.

The expense and effort hardly

seem warranted in view of the little value such briefs serve.
But, at least in this case, the brief has already been duplicated by the clerk's office in order that each Justice could
pass on the motion.

At this point, it appears fruitless to

question whether this brief should have been printed.

Maybe

the Court has a policy of allowing the filing of unprinted
amicus briefs.
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BENCH MEMO
No. 71-5103 MORRISSEY v. BREWER, WARDEN
This case ( cert from 8th Circuit 4 to 3 decision) involves as its sole
issue whether a parolee is entitled to due process rights before his parole
may be revoked.
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The Iowa procedure with respect to paroles is as follows: There is
a three-member parole board, with power to grant and revoke parole. Once
an inmate is placed on parole, he is under the supervision of the director of
corrections, but "remains in the legal custody of the warden." The Iowa
Code provides that "all paroled prisoners are subject at any time to be
taken into custody and returned to the institution from which they were
paroled." There is no requirement for notice or hearing.
The Iowa Supreme Court has construed its statutes as follows:
"The Iowa statutes do not provide for such a hearing before
the parole board. The board is given no power to issue
subpoenas nor swear witnesses. . . . It is an administrative

2.
function rather than judicial." (A. 123)
In 1965 the 8th Circuit approved the procedure followed in Iowa,
and expressly held as follows:
"A parole is a matter of grace, not a vested right. A large
discretion is left to the states as to the manner and terms
upon which paroles may be granted and revoked. Federal
due• process does not require that a parole revocation be
predicated upon notice and opportunity to be heard. "
(A 124).
Conflict with 7th Circuit In Han v. Burke, 430 F. 2d 100, (1970),
the 7th Circuit - following Goldber gv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, held that due
process applies at least to the extent of a Goldberg type hearing. (In
Goldberg the Court held that notice and hearing are necessary, but that the
hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi judicial trial.

The

welfare recipient must have an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses
and to present his own arguments and evidence orally before an impartial
decision maker, with counsel if he so desires - although the state need not
provide counsel.)
But the majority in this case (Morrissey v. Brewer) did not think
Goldberg to be controlling - a welfare recipient being entitled to specified
rights under a statute, as contrasted with a parolee who is still serving a
prison sentence.
The Court's analysis of the status of parole is as follows:
"Parole relates to an administrative action taken after the
convict has served a portion of his sentence behind prison

3.
wallf It is not a suspension of sentence, but a 'substitution
during the continuance of the parole, of a lower grade of
punishment, by confinement in the legal custody and under
the control of the warden within specified prison mc:EIHlUix
bounds outside the prison, for the confinement within the
prison adjudged by the court. '. . • Parole does not end or
in any way affect a prisoner's sentence, but is a correctional
device authorizing service of sentence outside the penitentiary. "
(A. 126-27)

The Court distinguished Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) on the
ground that "probation" is presentencing, and revocation of probation is
"a stage in the criminal proceedings. " Such proceedings had ended, however,
when one is sentenced to prison.

Thereafter, no criminal proceedings is

involved.
Dissenting Opinion :

~

A strong dissent by Judge Lay (joined Heaney and Bright) argues in

"

favor of certain limited due process rights, relying primarily on Goldberg.
The minority opinion takes up each one of the majority's arguments and
answers it fairly well.
I was also impressed by the minority's argument that several states
do prescribe hearings on revocation of parole, and that no great problems
have resulted. ( A. 142)
The minority reasons that this Court has held that prisoners have
constitutional rights.
•
Avery,
393 U. S. 483.

See Cooper v. Pate, 370 U. S. 546; Johnson v. AorHxg
The minority also cites the recent Second Circuit

4.
opinion by Judge Kaufman in in Sostre v. McGinnis,

F. 2d

( February 24, 1971), where certain "minimal" due process rights were
accorded a prisoner with respect to solitary confinement. It is not difficult,
as a matter of logic, to reason that if confined prisoners have some due process
rights, those on parole also have such rights.

The difficult question relates

to when and under what circumstances do a prisoner's rights reach the point
of requiring notice, hearing, confrontation with witnesses and the like.

.-.
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CH"-Ml!IERS 01"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE
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No. 71-5103 -- Morrissey v. Brewer
f.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

Enclosed is proposed opinion.
Please note that the "tentative" idea I mentioned at
Conference has now "ripened" into a procedural step
in terms of the "preliminary hearing." The experience
under Hyser v. Reed for the Federal system, with a
prompt hearing after arrest, has not been found adminis tratively unmanageable.
Regards,

~u:vuim <qcud cf tltt ~ttitt~ ~fl:tftg
'llallfyhtgfott, J.

<q.

211.;i'~J

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 14, 1972

Re:

No. 71-5103 - Morrissey v. Brewer

Dear Chief:
Subject to what others may have in mind,
I join your opinion in this case, with the suggestion, however, that you eliminate or modify
the last sentence of footnote 17 in view of the
fact that the circuits are in conflict on the
question and we once granted a case to decide
the issue.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

..
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6/15/72
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MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
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No. 71-5103, Morrissey y. B r e w e r - ~ ~ ~ ,y« "f
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~~¢J.J..--'-'..
This is the case which presents t ~ a t
due process requires prior to parole revocation.
The CJ has circulated an opinion for the Court, which
holds that due process requires,
(1)

a minimal hearing before an independent officer

at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole viol~tion,
as promptly as convenient after arresto

The object of this

"minimal" hearing is to determine whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the parolee has committed acts which
would constitute a violation of parole conditions.
(2)

a plenary hearing, if desired by the parolee,

prior to the final decision on revocation by the parole
authority,

This hearing is the final evaluation of any

contested relevant facts.

The parolee must have an opportunity

to be heard, although he need not have an opportunity to
)

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

WOD has circulated an opinion Which goes farther in sev"
eral respects.

'I

•

WOD would require, in additions

(1)

the right to the assistance of counsel

(2)

the right to confront adverse witnesses

(3)

a parolee cannot be arrested unless the alleged

violation of parole is either a new criminal offense or
attempted flight.

That is, for mere

11

technical" violations

-2-

.,

(e.g., drinking, etc,), there should be notice and a hearing
before arrest,

It appears that several other members of the Court may
join WOD.

I also understand that several members of the

Court hav.re made suggestions to the CJ regarding changes
in his opinion, Which

is not (as I understand and gather

from his memo) exactly what the Conference decided,

I would wait a few days before joining anyone.

CEP

?•

'

;$u:pnmt (ijourt of tlrt 'J[tnitt~ .:§tattg
~a~dringfott. gl. QJ. 2.ll.;iJ-!.~
June 15, 1972

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

No. 71-5103 --Morrisseyv. Brewer

Dear Byron:
I have deleted the last sentence -- note
page 17.
Regards,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to Conference

.

'

Morrissey v.

Dear Chief:

Please Join me.

\'

\'

~uµ ·tme

<.q:om~!lt tltt ~ttilth ~ hl:ua

,irrudp:ngt!llt. :!B, Q}. 2.0ffe'li,
CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 19, 1972

Re:

No. 71-5103

-

Morrissey v. Brewer

' J,

'.- ,,

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

.;J.O. t1.
The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference

I"

'•

,Bttpttutt {401Ui it{ tlft ~~ ittatt•

-ulftttg~ J. QI. 2lt.;i,.,
C HA""1BE:RS Of"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 20, 1972

Re:

No. 71-5103 - Morrissey and Booher v. Brewer

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

/Al~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

j

1

tlrr i1ttitc~ .§tufrs
in.1!;'i[1iagton, p. <q. 20~ 1~J

.§1q.n:rn1r '1;ct1ti-t

Ltf

CHAMBn,s OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 22, 1972

71-5103 - Morrissey v. Warden
Dear Chief,
I am glad to join your opinion as recirculated today, with the understanding reached at
our Conference that the last full paragraph on
page 18 and its footnotes will be deleted or
substantially modified.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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John J. Morrissey and G. Donald On Writ of Certiorari
Booher, Petitioners,
to the United States
Court
of Appeals for
V.
Lou B. Brewer, Warden, et al.
the Eighth Circuit.

rJune

-, 1972]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opm1on
;-J ...
of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether / ~ 4ce1C, ._,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment e:;:_ ~
~ ~requires that a State afford an individual some oppor• ..,.,. ~
tunity to be heard prior to revoking his parole.
A"
_ _A _-,-Petitioner Morrissey was convicted of false drawing 6 « 4 : < 4 ' 1 1 ' , , , ~
•
or uttering of checks in 1967 pursuant to his guilty plea, ~ ~ ~
and was sentenced to not more than seven years' con- - I
finement. He was paroled from the Iowa State PeniC
tentiary in June 1968. Seven months later, at the di> .,
•
rection of his parole officer, he was arrested in his home
town as a parole violator and incarcerated in the county
jail. One week later, after review of the parole officer's
written report, the Iowa Board of Parole revoked Morrissey's parole and he was returned to the penitentiary
located about 100 miles from his home. Petitioner asserts he received no hearing prior to revocation of his
pa.role.
The parole officer's report on which the Board of
Parole acted shows that petitioner's parole was revoked
on the basis of information that he had violated the
conditions of parole by buying a car under an assumed
name and operating it without permission, giving false
statements to police concerning his address and insur-

tA,..,/a . Js

.

, .,
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ance company after a minor accident, and obtaining
credit under an assumed name and failing to report his
place of residence to his parole officer. The report states
tlrn.t the officer interviewed Morrissey, and that he could
not explain " ·hy he did not contact his parole officer
despite his effort to excuse this on the ground that he
had been sick. Further, the report asserts that Morrissey admitted buying the car and obtaining credit
under an assumed name a.nd als-o admitted being involved in the accident. The parole officer recommended
that his parole be revoked because of "his continual
violating of his parole rules."
The situation as to pet,itioner Booher is much the
same. Pursuant to his guilty plea, Booher was convicted of forgery in 1966 and sentenced to a rna.xirnum
term of 10 years. He was paroled November 14, 10G8.
In August 1969, at his parole officer's direction, he was
arrested in his home town for a violation of his parole
and confined in the county jail several miles away. On
September 13, 1969, on the basis of a written report
by his parole officer, the Io,va Boa.rd of Parole revoked
Booher's pa.role and Booher was recommitted to the
state penitentiary, located about 250 miles from his
home, to complete service of his sentence. Petitioner
asserts he received no hearing prior to revocation of his
parole.
The parole officer's report with respect to Booher
recommended that his pa.role be revoked because he had
violated the territorial restrictions of his parole without
consent, had obtained a driver's license under an assumed
name and operated a motor vehicle without permission,
and had violated the employment condition of his parole
by failing to keep himself in gainful employment. The
report stated that the officer had interviewed Booher
and that he had acknowledged to the parole officer that
he had left the specified territorial limits and had oper-

71-510:l-OPINION
l\[ORRISSEY v. BREWER
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atecl the car and had obta.ined a license under an assumed name "knowing that it was wrong." The report
further noted that Booher had stated that he had not
found employment because he could not find work that
would pay him what he wanted- he stated he would
11ot work for $2.25 to $2.75 per hour- a.nd that he had
left the area to get work in another city.
After exhausting state remedies, both petitioners filed
habeas cor)
)Ctitions in the United States District
ourt for the Southern District of Iowa alleging that
they liacl been denied due process because their paroles
had been rcvoke~1thout a hearing. The Sta.te responded by argurng that no hearing was required. The
District Court held on the basis of controlling authority
that the State's failure to accord a hearing prior to
parole revocation did not violate due process.
The Court of Appeals, dividing 4 to 3, held that due
process docs not reqmrc a heanng. The majority recognized that the traditional view of parole as a privilege rather than a vested right is no longer dispositive
as to whether due process is applicable; however, on a
balancing of the competing interests involved, it concl.!!_9ecl that no hearing is required. The court re~d
that parole is only "a correctional device authorizing
service of sentence outside the penitentiary"; the parolee
is still "in custody." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was of the view that prison officials must have
large discretion in making revocation determinations,
and that courts should retain their traditional reluctance
to interfere with disciplinary matters properly under
the control of state prison authorities. The majority
expressed the view that "non-legal, non-adversary considerations" were often the determi11ative factor in making a parole revocation decision. It expressed the fear
that if adversary hearings were required for parole revocation, "with the full panoply of rights accorded in

I
r

71-510::l-OPINION
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criminal proceedings," the function of the parole board
as "an administrative body acting in the role of 7wrens
JJatriae would be aborted" and the board would be more
reluctant to grant parole in the first instance. Additionally, the majority reasoned that, the parolee has no
statutory right to remain on parole. Iowa law provides he is subject to being returned to the institution
at any time. Our holding in M empa v. Rhay, 389 U. S.
128 ( 1967), was distinguished ':on the ground that in
involved deferred sentencing upon probation revocation,
and thus involved a stage of the cr!i'i'imal proceeding,
whereas parole revocation was not a stage in the criminal proceedings.
In its brief in this Court, the State asserts for the first
time that petitioners were in fact granted hearings after
they were returned to the penitentiar;- More genera.lly,
the State says that within two months after the Board
revokes an individual's parole and order him returned
to the penitentiary, on the basis of the parole officer's
written report, it grants the individual a hearing before
the Board. At that time the Board goes over "each of
the alleged parole violations with the returnee, and he
is given an opportunity to orally present his side of
the story to the Board." If the returnee denies the report, it is the practice of the Board to conduct n, further
investigation before making a final determination either
affirming the initial revocation, modifying it, or reversing it. 1 The State asserts that Morrissey, whose parole
was revoked on January 31, 1969, was granted a hearing before the Board on February 12, 1969. Booher's
1
The hea.riui required b)· duo proccs,, ns tldinrtl hNrin, mu:,;t
h r nccorclrd before the dfcrtini drcision. Srr Armstro11(! Y. Monza.
3 0 U. S. 545 (1965). Petitionrr a"~Prt:-: hNr thal on!)· 0110 of the
5-W rrvoratiom; ordered most rcrrntly by thr Imm Parole Board
,1·aH rcver~ed aflcr hearing, Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 7, suggesting
i-lial, tllC' hearing may nol ob,irrt.ivdy cvaluntc the rC'\'O('ntion cleei~ion .

1
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parole was revoked on September 13, 1969, and he was
granted a hearing on October 14, 1969. At these hearings, the State tells us-in the briefs-both Morrissey
and Booher admitted the violations alleged in the parole
violation reports.
Nothing in the record supplied to this Court indicates
that the State claimed, either in the District Court or
the Court of Appeals, that petitioners had received hearings promptly after their paroles were revoked, or that
in such hearing they admitted the violations; that information comes to us <2,nly in the State's brief here.
Further, even the assertions that the State makes here
are not based on any public record but on interviews
with two of the members of the parolo board. The
interview relied on to show that petitioners admitted
their violations did not indicate that the member could
remember that in fact both Morrissey and Booher admitted the parole violations with which they were
charged. He stated only that, according to his memory, in the previous several years all but three returnees
had admitted commission of the parole infractions alleged and that neither of the petitioners was among
the three who denied them.
\Ve must therefore treat this case in the posture and
on the record the State elected to rely on in the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. If the facts are otherwise, the State may make a showing in the District
Court that petitioners in fact have admitted the violations charged before a neutral officer.

I
Before reaching the issue of what is required by dueprocess, it is important to have in mind a picture of
the role of parole in this country.
During the past 60 years,-the practice of releasing
prisoners on parole before the end of their sentences

I
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has become an integral part of the penologica1 system.
Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 Geo.
L. J. 705 (1968). Rather than being an ad hoc exercise
of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals. Its purpose is to
help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive
individuals as soon as they are able to and without being
confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It
also serves to alleviate the costs to society of kcepi11g
an individual in prison." The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence,
on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules
during the balance of the sentence. Under some systems parole is granted automatically after the service
of a certain portion of a prison term. Under others,
parole is granted by the discrctiona.r y action of a board
which evaluates an array of information about a prisoner and undertakes a prediction whether he is ready
to reintegrate into society. To accompfo,h the purpose
of parole, those who arc a.Bowed to leave prison early
are subjected to specified conditions for the duration of
their terms. These conditions restrict their activities
substantially beyond the ordinary restrictions imposed
by law on an individual citizen. Typically parolees
arc forbidden to use liquor or to have associations or
correspondence with certain categories of undesirable
persons. Typically also they must, seek permission from
their parole officers before engaging in specified activities, such as changing employment or living quarters,
marrying, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, traveling outside the community and incurring substa.ntial
indebtedness. Additionally, pa.rolecs must regularly re" Rrr Warrrn . Probn1ion in the Frdrr;d R)·~trm of Criminal .Ju~tier. 20 Frei. Prob. :~ (lfl.55); Anrni;tl Hrport , Ohio Ad11lt P:trole
A11thoritr 19fl-l-/ G5. at 1::i-1-1-, Notr. P:1rolr: A Critiq11r of Tt~ Lrgal
Fo1111dation~ and Condit.ion~. 38 N. Y. U. L. Re·\'. 702 , 70G (IDG:1).
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port to the parole officer to whom they are assigned and
sometimes they must make periodic written reports of
their activities. Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rules,
15 Crime and Delinquency 267, 272-273 (1969).
The parole officers are part of the administrative system designed to assist parolees and to offer them guidance. The conditions of parole serve a dual purpose;
they prohibit, either absolutely or conditionally, behavior
which is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society. And through the requirement of reporting to the parole officer and seeking
guidance and perrnisi-ion before doing many things, the
officer is provided with information about the parolee
and an opportunity to advise him. The combination
puts the parole officer into the position in which he can
try to guide the parolee into constructive development.=i
The enforcement leverage which supports the parol~
conditions derives from the authority to return the parolee to prison to serve out the balance of his sentence
if he fails to abide by the rules. In practice not every
violation of the conditions of parole automatically leads
to revocation. Typically a parolee will be counseled
to abide by the conditions of parole, and the parole
officer ordinarily does not take steps to have parole revoked unless he thinks that the violations are serious
and continuing so as to indicate that the parolee is
not adjusting properly and cannot be counted on to
avoid antisocial activity. 1 The broad discretion accorded
the parole officer is also inherent in some of the quite·
vague conditions, such as the typical requirement that
the parolee avoid "undesirable" associations or correspondence. Cf. Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U. S. 4
" Xotr, Ob~c1Tations on tllC' .\dmini~tra1ion of J':irolc, 7!) Ynl r-

L. ,T. 69S, 699-700 ( 1970).
1
Ibid.
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(Hl70). Yet revocation of parole is not an unusual
phenomenon, affecting only a few parolees. It has been
estimated that 35-45% of all parolees are rnbjected to
revocation and return to prison.r. Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime;
it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of
the procedural case of recommitting the individual on
the basis of a lesser showing by the State.n
Implicit in the system of policing parole violations is
the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty
as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of
his parole. The first part of a decision to revoke parole
is thus a wholly retrospective factual question: whether
the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more
conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that
the parolee did violate the conditions does the second
question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to
prison or should other steps be taken to protect society
aucl improve chances of rehabilitation. The second
question involves the application of expertise by the
parole authority in making a prediction as to th e ability
of the individual to live in society without committing antisocial acts. This part of the decision too depends on facts, and therefore it is important for the
Board to know not only that some violation was committed but also to know accurately how many and how
serious the violations were. The decision of what to
do with the parolee is not purely factual but also predictive and discretionary.
" Prrsitlent 's Commission on La.w Enforcem ent a nd Administrn1ion of ,Tu8ti ce, Correriio11s 62 . The subst a ntial re\"Orat ion ra te
ind icates t.hat parol e admi11islrafors oft en dcliberatcl)· rrr 011 t he
~ido of gra nting parole in borderlin e cases.
,; See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F, 2d 942, at 953-954, n. 5 (CA8
1871) (Lay, J ., di ~se nting) ; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F. 2d 91_, 104
(CAG 1968 ) (Cclcbrczzc, J ., dissenling) .

'

'
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If a parolee is returned to prison, he often receives no,
credit for the time "served" on parole.'

II

\

l

We begin with the proposition that the revocation
of parole is not part of a crimilJal prosecution and thus
the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a
proceeding docs not apply to parole revocations. Cf.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967). Parole arises
after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. Supervision is not directly by the
court but an administrative agency, which is sometimes an arm of the court and sometimes of the executive. Revocation deprives an individual not of the absolute liberty every citizen is entitled to, but only of
the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.
We turn therefore to the quest}on whether the requirements of due process in general apply to parole·
revocations. It has been said so often by this Court
and others as not to require citation of authority that
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. As MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN has written recently, "This Court \
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn
upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson,
403 U. S. 365, 374. Whether an roccdural protections \
ar:e due de ends on the extent to w 1c an rn 1 ual
w1 1 e condemned to suffer grievous oss.
oint
iiFascist Refugee Committee v. McDratli, 341 U. S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), quoted in Gold7
Arlukc, A Summary of Parole Rulc:,-Thirtccn Year:,; Later, 15
Crime and Delinquency 267, 271 (1969); Note, Parole Revoca1.ion
in 1hc Fcdcrnl Sy8tcm, 56 Geo. L. J. 705, 733 (1968).

.,
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berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 154, 163 (1970). "fC]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin ,vith a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action." Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union v. M cElroy, 367 U. S. 886,
895 (1961). The question is not merely the "weight"
of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of
the interest is one within the contemplation of the
"liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Applying these standards to the revocation of parole,
we conclude that revocation of an individual's parole
status calls for certam procedures, the general nature
of which arc hereafter describea.
The State's interests are several. The State has found
the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That
finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the
individual's liberty. Release of the parolee before the
end of his prison sentence is made with the recognition
that ,vith many prisoners there is a risk that they will
not be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. Given the previous conviction
and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has
an overwhelming interest in being able to return the
individual to imprisonment without the burden of a
new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to
abide by the conditions of his parole.
Most of the States have recognized that there is no
interest on the part of the State in revoking parole
without some procedural guarantees.;
Although the parolee is often formally described as
being "in custody," the argument cannot even be made
' Seo n. 16 , infra .

·•

I
I
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here that summary treatment is necessary as it may
be with respect to controlli11g a large group of potentially disruptive prisoners in actual custody. Nor are
,rn persuaded by the argument that revocation is so
totally a discretionary matter that some form of hearing would be administratively intolerable. The discre-(
tionary aspect of revocation should never be reached
unless there is first an appropriate determination that
the individual has in fact breached the conditions of
parole. A simple factual hearing will not interfere with
the exercise of discretion. Serious studies have suggested
that fair treatment on parole revocation will contribute
to the rehabilitative prospects and not result in fewer
grants of parole."
The parolee, of course, has a great interest involved
in his potential revocation. He is at liberty. Though
the State properly subjects him to many restrictions
not applicable to other citizens, his liberty is very different from the condition of confinement in a prison. 10
The parolee probably has reestablished some of his ties
on the outside of prison and at least has begun to reintegrate himself into normal life. He may have been
enjoying this conditional liberty for a number of years
and may be living a relatively normal life at the time

I

'' 8C'c PrC'1<idC'nt.'~ Comm'n on L:1\I' FnforcrmC'nt :ind Admini~trntion
of .TustirC', T:i~k ForcC' RC'porl: CorrC'ction~ s:~. 88 (l!JG7): Sklar,
Lnw and Practice' in Probation and PnrolC' llC'Yocntion HC'nrinir.-,
.'iii .T. Crim. L., and P. 8. 175, 194 (HJG-1) (110 dC'rrC'a~C' in l\firhil?;fl11 ,
\l'hirh gr:mts C'Xtl'JJf(iYC' righ1~): Rose v. Ilas!.-ins, 388 F. 2d !H, 102
11. 16 (CAG 1968) (CelPbn'zzr, .T. . cli~"e11ti11g) (ro~t of irnprisonnwnt.
,.:o much irreatrr thn11 cost of pnrolC' S)',.:1cm that procC'<lurnl l'C'(]1lircment,~ will not change economic motinttion).
10
"H i~ not ~ophiRtir t.o a1tnrh grrat,er importance to n prr~on'~
.iu"tifi:ihle reliance in mai11tni11ing hi" eondition:11 freedom 1,0 long as
hr nbidC',- b)· the condition!'( of hi,- relrm,e, than lo hi:,: merC' antiripn1ion or hope of frrC'dom." Bey Y. Connecticut Del. of l'arole, 4-!3
F. 2d 10i9, lOSG (CA2 1971).

,,
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he is faced with revocation. 11 Release on parole must
be seen as including at least an implicit promise that
parole will not be revoked unless the parolee fails to
live up to these comlitions. In many cases the parolee
faces lengthy incarceration if his parole is revoked. Additionally, the revocation of parole puts an additional
and serious blot on a man's record. The parolee's in- \ \
terest must be seen as included within the scope of the
"liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

III

g.r~S:s

The question remains what
is due. Not every
proceeding need be attended by s erigia abstract procedural formula. Due process is not an all-or-nothing
concept. 12
-fhere are two stages in the process of parole revocation that are important. The first occurs when the
parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction of his parole officer. The second is when parole
is formally revoked. There is typically a substantial
time lag between the arrest and the eventual determination by the parole board whether parole should
be revoked. Additionally, it may be that the parolee
is arrested at a place distant from the state prison, to
which he may be returned before the final decision is
made concerning revocation. Given these factors, due
process would seem to require S'2,_me minimal hearing to
be conducted at or reasonably near the place of the
alleged parole violation and as promptly as convenient
after arrest while information is fresh and rnurces are
available. Cf. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F. 2d 225 (CADC
See, e. g., Murray v. Page, 429 F. 2d 1359 (CA7 19i0) (pnrole
revoked after eight years; 15 years remnining on originnl term).
1
~ Sec K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.16, al 356-359
(1970 Supp.) ("Fart-finding processes can be summn.ry or quick
without being basicnll)· unfair.").
11

j
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I

1963). Such an inquiry should be seen as in the nature
of a "Preliminary hearing'' to determine whether there
is p.r_obable cause or "?easonable grounds to belive that
the arrested parolee has committed acts which would
constitute a violation of parole conditions.
The determination of reasonable grounds should be
made
.......,_ by someone not directly involved- in the case .
It woillcl be unfair to assume that an mdiv1dual par'crre
officer does not conduct an interview with the parolee
to confront him with the reasons for revocation before
he recommends an arrest. It would also be unfair to
assume that the parole officer bears hostility against
the parolee which destroys his neutrality; realistically
the failure of the parolee is in a sense a failure for his
supervising officer.1 3 However, we need make no, assumptions one way or the other to conclude that there
should be an uninvolved person to make this preliminary evaluation of the basis for believing the conditions ~
of parole have been violated. The officer directly involved in making reconunendations cannot always have
complete objectivity in evaluating them. 11 Goldberg v.
Kelly found it unnecessary to impugn the motives of
the caseworker to find a need for an independent
decisionmaker.
This independent officer need not be a judicial officer.
Parole and parole revocation are matters properly handled by nonjudicial administrative officers. In Goldberg, the Court pointedly did not require that the hearing
" ' Note, Ol>~crva1ions on the Admin. of Parole. 79 Yale L. J.
GOS, 704-706 (1970) (parole officers in Connecticut adopt role
modol of ~ocial worker rathC'!' than an adjunct of police, ai1d exhibit
ts la.ck of punitive orientation).
11
This is not an is ue limited to bad motivnt ion. "l'arolc agents
arc human . aud it is po~:-ible that friction helwern the agC'nl :rnd
1ho parolee may h:we i11flucncC'<l the agent'::; judgment." 4 Attorney General's Survey 011 Relen~e Procedure:- 24(\--2-17 ( l 980).
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on termination of benefits be before a judicial officer
or even before the traditional "neutral and detached"
officer; it required only that the hearing be conducted
by some person other than one initially dealing "·ith
the case. It will be sufficient, therefore, in the parole
revoca.tion context if an evaluation of whether reasonable cause exists to believe that conditions of parole have
been violated is made by a parole officer other than
the one who has made the report of parole violations
or has recommended revocation. A State could certainly choose some other independent decisionmaker to
to perform this preliminary function.
With respect to the preliminary hearing before this
officer, the parolee should be given notice that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine
whether ere is probable cause to believe he has committed a parole v10 a 1011.
1 notice must state ,vhat
parole violations have been a.llegecl. At the hearing
the parolee may appear and speak in his own behalf;
he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can
give relevant information to the hearing officer.
The h~ing officer shall have the duty of making a
summary, or diges~ of what transpires at the hearing
in terms of the responses of the parolee and the substance of the documents or evidence given in support
of the parolee's position. Based on the information
before him, the officer should determine whether there
is probable cause to hold the parolee for the final decision of the parole board on revocation. Such a determination would be sufficient to warrant the parolee's
continued detention and return to the state correctional
institution pending the final decision. As in Goldberg,
"tho decision-maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on ... "
but it should be remembered that this is not a final

I

71-5103-0 PIN ION

MOTIRTRSEY v. BREWER

15

determination calling for "formal findings of fa.ct or
conclusions of law." 397 U. S., at 271. No interest
would be served by formalism in this process.
There must also be an opportunity for a hearing, if
it is desired by the parolee, prior to the final decision
on revocation by the parole authority. This hearing
must be t
asis for more than determining prob1inle
cause; it must lead to a final eva uation of an contested
rclevant fac s.
e parolee must have an opportunity
to be heard and to show, if he can, that ~ t
violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances
in mitigation suggest the violation does not warrant
revocation.
We .gannot write a code o\&rocedure; that is the responsibility of each State.
ost States have done so
by legislation; others by judicial decision usually on due
process grounds.'" Om task is limited to deciding the
1
" Ver~· few S1atr~ pro,·idr no hraring; at, :di in parolr rrvoca1iorn,. Thirty 81:1tr~ prol'idr in their st:itut0~ thnt :1 p:1ro!C'0 shall
1w0ini ~omr t~·pr of hearing;. S0r Ah. Cocl0 Tit. 42, § 12 (1951'):
Ah-ka Stat;. § 3:u.j.220 (]%2): Ariz. Rrl'. Stat,,. ,\m1. § 31-417
(1939); Ark. Stnts. Ann. § 43-2810 (19fi8); Dr!. Code Ann. Tit. 11,
§ 43,52 (]9()4); Fla. State<. Ann. § 9-t7.23 (1) (1955): Ca. Coclr
.'1.1111. § 77-519 (1965): JI:mnii Rrl'. 8tnk § 3:33-66 (Hlfi7); Idaho
Code §§ 20-229, 20-229A (Hl70): Ill. Ann. Stats. c. 108, § 205
(1970); Incl. Stnts. Ann.§ 13-lflll (HlfH); Kan. Stnt. Ann.§ 22-3721
(1970); K~,. Rev. Stats. Ann. §§439.330 (l)(e) (1956), 439.430 (1)
(1966); 439.440 (195fi): La. Rev. Stnt~. § 15:574.9 (1968); Me. Rev.
Stnts. Ann. r. 34, § 1G75 (10(i9); ::\Td. Ann. Code, ArL. 41, § 117
(1957); ::\Tirh. Comp. Lnws Ann. § 791.1-tO (n) (Hlf\8): Mi~H. Cod0
Ann. § 400-1-1:1 (195G); l\Io. Ann. Rtnt:,. § 5-+9.16,5 (1967); :\font.
Hrv. Coc!C' §§ 9-1-983~. 9-1-9835 (19,55): ~- H. Hel'. Stat~. Ann.
§ 607:46 (1939); N. :i\I. St:1t;;. Ann. §-tl-17-2S (196:~); Con~. L:m,
of X. Y. Correction Lnw § 212 (1970); 'N. D. Cent. Code 12-59-]5
( 1963); Pa. Stats. Ann. Tit. 61, § 331.21 (1951), Tit. 61, § 331.2a
(Hl57): TC'nn. Coclr § 40-361!) (1955); T0x:1i-i Code of Crim. Pror.,
Art. 41-12, § 22 (1965); Vermont Stnts. Ann. Tit. 28, § 1081

1
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minimum requirements of due process. In our view,
iliey mclude (a) notice of the ciaimed violations of
.-.
/.,./,. .._ r...,-.,l
parole; (b) disclosure of the information against the
parolee except when some unusual circumstance ca1ls
for confidentiality;TcT opportunity to be heard in person
and to )resen witnesses and documentary evidence;
( d) a "n~tral and cletachec 1earmg o y sue 1 as a
~~
traditional parole board, members of "·11ich need not
I
a,-:-,
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (e) a statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole. Whether in a particular case fairness //
requires that the parolee be allowec! to confront and
~~
cross-examme ad:'"verse witnesses 1s a uest10n to be determme y e earmg o cer m t 1e particu ar case. See
Davis, Adiritnistrahve Law Treatise ¾7.16, at 356-357
~~
(1970 Supp.). We emphasize there is no thought to
f,o
~
equate this process to a criminal prosecution; it is a
narrow factfinding inquiry; the process should be flexible
enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits,
and other material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial.

1

1/1,~ -

I J..

1

~

~~lo

)(-Z,.,,

(1968); Wash. R0v. Code §§ 9.95.120 1hrough 9.95.126 (19fi9);
W. Va. Code § 62-12-19 (1059). D0cision · of stn10 rrn<l f.r<lcral
rourts haYe required a number of otlwr S1at0~ to provide hrariugi.
See Hutchinson v. Patterson, 267 F. Supp. 433 (Colo. 1967); United
States ex rel. Bey v. Conn. Bd. Parole, 443 F. 2d 1079 (CA2 1971);
Brown v. Sigler, 186 Neb. 800, 186 N. W. 2d 735 (1971): 8tate v.
Ilolmes, 109 N . .T. Super. 180, 2fi2 A. 2d 725 (1970); PcoJ)lc e.r rel.
JI enechino v. TV arde11. 27 N. Y. 2d 376, 267 N. E. 2d 238, 31S
K. Y. S. 2d 449 (1971); Murray v. Page, 429 F. 2d 1:~5Q (C:\10
1970) (Oklahoma) (10th Cir. abo inclml0~ W:,oming): Beardcm
v. South Carolina, 443 F. 2d 1090 (CA4 1971) (4th Cir. also inclucfes
N'orth Carolina and Virp;inia); Beal v. Truner, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454
P. 2d 624 (1969); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (ED Wis.
1971). Nine States arc affected by no legal requirement to grant any
kind of hearing.

'·
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Counsel or the help of a friend or a staff counselor
or case workers should be permitted, 1 a but we do not
rnish ~uch assi';t:
decide that the State is re uir
11
i:wce.
The issues in a parole revocation are not conplex; no significant legal questions normally arise.
We have no thought to create an inflexible structure
for parole revocation procedures. The few basic requirements set out above should not impose a great
burden on any State's parole system. Control over the
required proceedings by the hearing officers can assure
that delaying tactics and other abuses sometimes present in the traditional adversary trial situation do not
occur. Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other forums, such as is presented when the revocation is based on conviction of
another crime.
In the peculiar posture of this case, given the absence
of an adequate record, we conclude the ends of justice
will be best served by remanding the cases to the Court
of Appeals for their return to the District Court with
directions to make findings on the procedures actually
followed by the Parole Board in these two revocations.
If it is determined that petitioners admitted parole violations to the Parole Board, as Iowa contends, and if
ia The Model Penni Code § 305.16 (Proposed Offirial Draft 1962)
provide,; that "The institutional parole staff slrnll render reasonable
a id t.o the parolee in preparation for the hearing and he shall be
permitted to advise with his own legal counsel.
17
From 1ime to time it is suggest.rd that every institution have
a "legal aid" or "prisoner aide" staff member qualified to al',ist
pri;;onern in t.hesc situations. In all likelihood,, the experimental
projects in this field will lead Sta1 cs to try ]lroviding such as;,;i~tance,
and perhaps they will find that this soh·es some problem~ t ha.t
plague correctional in.·tilutions. At this stage there i:,; inHufficicnt
empirical dat:1 to ii;uide a, conclusion whether due JlI'OCC~s require;,;
roun~el or o1hcr as::<istance in all such cases.
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those violations are found to be reasonable grounds
for revoking parole under state standards, that would
end tho matter. If the procedures followed by tho
Parole Board are found to meet tho standards laid down
in this opinion that, too, would dispose of the due process
claims for these cases.

C
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We remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rem.anded.

